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BOOK REVIEWS 
Epistemic Justification, by Richard Swinburne. Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. 
viii,262. $65.00 (hardback), $15.99 (paperback). 
JOHN GRECO, Fordham University 
Richard Swinburne tells us that his book has two major concerns. The 
first is to explicate what it is for a belief to be justified, or (equivalently) 
what it is for someone to be justified at a certain time in holding some 
belief. The second is to explain the difference between mere true belief 
and knowledge. Regarding the first issue, Swinburne follows William 
Alston in holding that there is no univocal concept of epistemic justifica-
tion. Rather, different epistemologists treat different senses of justifica-
tion. The question that becomes important, then, is which kinds of justi-
fication are worth having. Regarding the second issue, Swinburne does 
Alston one better, endorsing an analogous pluralism about the concept 
of knowledge. "There are ... different kinds of warrant, and so of 
knowledge" (p. 4). Again, the salient question becomes what kinds of 
knowledge are worth having. An important distinction for Swinburne is 
that between synchronic justification (what it is for a belief to be a justi-
fied response to the situation in which a believer finds herself at a given 
time) and diachronic justification (what it is for a synchronically justified 
belief to be based on adequate investigation). Other important distinc-
tions regard the different senses in which a belief can be "probable," and 
the different senses in which a belief can be "based" on its evidence. 
These distinctions, in turn, lead to different kinds of internalist and 
externalist justification. 
Although various kinds of justification are distinguished, a focus is on 
what Swinburne calls "synchronic objective internalist justification." A 
belief is justified in this sense just in case "it is rendered logically proba-
ble by the subject's rightly basic beliefs ... and based on the latter, both 
in the sense of being caused by them and in the senses that the subject 
believes that it is caused by them and renders them [sic.] (logically) 
probable" (p. 158). A belief that is justified in this sense, Swinburne 
explains, is "the consciously rational response to evidence in the form of 
basic beliefs that would be made by a logically omniscient being" (p. 
158). According to Swinburne, this sort of justification has both instru-
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mental and intrinsic value: beliefs that are justified in this sense are 
objectively likely to be true, and are valuable in their own right, even if 
not true. On the other hand, no kind of external justification has intrin-
sic value. Externalist justification is of instrumental value only (pp. 
163-4). When Swinburne investigates diachronic justification he reaches 
similar conclusions. "There is no intrinsic value in a subject pursuing a 
course of investigation that as a matter of fact usually leads to better jus-
tified beliefs, unless the subject believes that this kind of investigation 
usually does have this result and is pursuing it for that reason" (p. 185). 
On the other hand, "we value diachronic objective internalist justifica-
tion for its own sake" (p. 185). 
One helpful feature of the book is that it is divided between a main 
body of text and several additional notes at the end of the book. These 
additional notes and an appendix explore special issues (usually in 
probability theory) that will be of more interest to the expert than to the 
average undergraduate taking a course in epistemology. There are some 
unusual features as well. For example, chapter two is a long discussion 
about the nature of belief, even though Swinburne admits that the views 
presented there are not of central concern to a book on epistemic justifi-
cation (pp. 52, n14; 55). Similarly, many of the additional notes treat 
problems that are not clearly epistemological. These include discussions 
about decision theory, randomness, the status of laws of nature, and 
computational accounts of simplicity. The book also contains short (and 
to my mind inadequate) discussions of contextualism and virtue theory. 
All of these features can be traced to Swinburne's Bayesian approach to 
epistemology. Within that approach, some issues that are commonly 
considered to be of central importance become marginal, while issues 
associated with probability theory take pride of place. 
Swinburne's version of this approach requires that all contingent 
propositions have an a priori, intrinsic probability. It also requires that 
there are objective, a priori relations of support between any two propo-
sitions; that is, a measure of support "quite independent of other facts 
about the objects referred to in those propositions" (p. 64). Many 
philosophers will balk at these assumptions, and Swinburne does little 
to allay their worries. As far as I can see, his only argument for the 
assumptions is that they are required for rational inquiry. Here is a typi-
cal passage. 
If science is really a rational enterprise in the sense that certain evi-
dence really does make one hypothesis more probable and another 
hypothesis less probable, and so there are indeed correct criteria of 
inductive inference, ... there must be principles of probability 
additional to the Bayesian axioms, and in particular a priori princi-
ples for ascribing intrinsic probabilities .... But if there are no such 
a priori criteria, we should give up studying science, history, and 
every other subject of university study. For no one will be able to 
produce evidence that others can correctly recognize as making 
one hypothesis in the field more probable than any of an infinite 
number of rivals; and no retrodiction or prediction as any more 
probable than any other (p. 122). 
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The implicit argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
Rational inquiry is possible only if there are a priori criteria for 
ascribing intrinsic probabilities. 
Rational inquiry is possible 
Therefore, 
There are such criteria. 
This argument would be a good one if both its premises were accept-
able, but what reason do we have for accepting the first premise? Many 
philosophers will think that there are clear alternatives. One that comes 
to mind is that contingent propositions have no a priori or intrinsic 
probability. Rather, their epistemic status is entirely a function of con-
tingent features of the knower and her environment. For example, the 
epistemic status of perceptual beliefs is a function of contingent features 
of the perceiver and of the perceptual situation. Likewise, there are no 
(or few) necessary or a priori relations of support between contingent 
propositions. Rather, evidence relations are a function of contingent fea-
tures of the reasoner, together with contingent facts about what is a reli-
able indication of what. On this view, there would be "correct criteria of 
inductive inference," but these would be tied to contingent features of 
human cognition and of the actual world, as opposed to a priori facts 
about intrinsic probabilities. Given the current popularity of such a 
view, one would like to see Swinburne say more about it. 
In summary, Swinburne has provided us with a clearly written, well-
developed version of a Bayesian approach to epistemology. The book 
explores many issues that are relevant to such an approach, while 
spending less time with others that would typically get more attention 
in an introduction to epistemology. Accordingly, readers who want to 
learn more about Bayesianism in epistemology, or who want to explore 
relevant issues more deeply, will be well served by this book. Those 
who come to the book with doubts about that approach, or about 
Swinburne's version of it, might be less satisfied. 
The Impossibility of God, edited by Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier. 
Prometheus Books, 2003. Pp. 438. $32.00. 
FRANK B. DILLEY, University of Delaware (Emeritus) 
This is a remarkable collection of articles. Some atheists have argued 
that the concept of God is meaningless, and others have argued that 
God's existence is improbable, but the editors of this collection say that 
they have gathered articles which argue that the existence of God is logi-
cally impossible, impossible in the same sense in which round squares 
are impossible. The editors helpfully introduce each section of the book, 
providing a summary of the central thesis of each individual paper, but 
